Labour Markets, Behavioural Norms and Identity

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Question

- Do labour markets reinforce gender norms by rewarding individual traits differently according to gender?

Supreme Court Ruling in Sex-Bias Case Hailed by Women's Rights Groups

COURT, From A1

The case began in 1983 when Ann B. Hopkins, a management consultant, was not among the 47 employees selected for partnership at Price Waterhouse, one of the nation's "big eight" accounting firms, even though she brought in more business than any of the other 87 candidates for partnership.

One supervisor suggested that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her

there was no discrimination in the first place and that Hopkins could not show that the comments she cited played any role in the specific decision in her case. The reason she was rejected, the company argued, was because she was too abrasive and difficult to work with.

The company said that an employee must prove "sex stereotyping" by male partners was the central reason; that Hopkins must show she would have been made a partner "but for" the discrimination.

But Brennan said that an employ-

er's decision before an employer can be made to justify it.

Justice Byron R. White also concurred but said that Brennan was requiring employers to produce objective evidence, as opposed to testimony, to meet their burden of proof.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined in dissent by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, said the decision was "certain to result in confusion" rather than clarify already "complex rules for employment discrimina-

ANN B. HOPKINS
. . . sued Price Waterhouse

Gender Norms and Identity




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Men
Women
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
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
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Men
Women
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
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Standardised Openess-To-Experience
Men
Women
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

Sector	Men	Women	Total	Male %	Female %	Dominance
Construction	809	80	889	91.00%	9.00%	
Transport	397	96	493	80.53%	19.47%	
Utilities	86	22	108	79.63%	20.37%	
Mining	180	53	233	77.25%	22.75%	
Manufacturing	620	212	832	74.52%	25.48%	
Agriculture	208	79	287	72.47%	27.53%	
Wholesale	251	120	371	67.65%	32.35%	
Public Admin	402	294	696	57.76%	42.24%	
Media	102	78	180	56.67%	43.33%	
Other	240	189	429	55.94%	44.06%	
Profressionals	466	384	850	54.82%	45.18%	
Arts	105	101	206	50.97%	49.03%	
Finance	182	199	381	47.77%	52.23%	
Real Estate	65	74	139	46.76%	53.24%	
Admin	149	173	322	46.27%	53.73%	
Retail	439	639	1078	40.72%	59.28%	
Accommodation	303	450	753	40.24%	59.76%	
Education	303	773	1076	28.16%	71.84%	
Health	302	1222	1524	19.82%	80.18%	

Occupation:	Men	Women	Total	Male %	Female %
Machinery Operators and Drivers	593	51	644	92.08%	7.92%
Technicians and Trades Workers	1211	215	1426	84.92%	15.08%
Labourers	667	339	1006	66.30%	33.70%
Managers	968	546	1514	63.94%	36.06%
Professionals	1146	1461	2607	43.96%	56.04%
Sales Workers	316	630	946	33.40%	66.60%
Community and Personal Service Workers	372	889	1261	29.50%	70.50%
Clerical and Administrative Workers	392	1141	1533	25.57%	74.43%

Finding the impact of being an outlier (β)

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{outlier} I + \gamma_x X + \epsilon_i$$

Does this effect differ for men compared to women?

$$H_0: \beta^W_{outlier} = \beta^M_{outlier}$$

The whole economy

VARIABLES	(1) Outliers Hourly Wage	(2) Psychological Hourly Wage	(3) All Hourly Wage
Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0750	-0.162***	-0.0945*
	(0.0468)	(0.0532)	(0.0519)
Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.101*	-0.00500	-0.0299
	(0.0543)	(0.0622)	(0.0619)
Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0398	-0.0929**	-0.0618
	(0.0398)	(0.0440)	(0.0418)
Female Outlier Openness	-0.134***	-0.114*	-0.0428
	(0.0227)	(0.0593)	(0.0588)
Male Outlier Agreeableness	0.0308	-0.0432	-0.0534*
	(0.0246)	(0.0319)	(0.0308)
Male Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.0342	-0.0159	0.0209
	(0.0453)	(0.0529)	(0.0519)
Male Outlier Extroversion	0.184***	0.105**	0.0391
	(0.0437)	(0.0477)	(0.0463)
Male Outlier Openness	0.0459**	0.0667	0.163***
	(0.0210)	(0.0573)	(0.0571)
Psychological Controls	N	Y	Y
Other Controls	N	N	Y
Observations	7,175	4,927	4,218
R-squared	0.010	0.099	0.287
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_agree} = \beta^M_{out\_agree}$	0.043	0.034	0.454
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_consc} = \beta^M_{out\_consc}$	0.339	0.888	0.507
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_extrv} = \beta^M_{out\_extrv}$	0.000	0.001	0.082
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_open} = \beta^M_{out\_open}$	0.000	0.022	0.009

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Gendered Industries

VARIABLES	(1) Male Dominated Hourly Wage	(2) Balanced Hourly Wage	(3) Female Dominated Hourly Wage
Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0776	-0.0630	-0.0631
	(0.143)	(0.0739)	(0.0888)
Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.161	0.0642	-0.0751
	(0.240)	(0.111)	(0.0742)
Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.142	-0.0329	-0.0380
	(0.137)	(0.0678)	(0.0556)
Female Outlier Openness	0.0928	-0.0248	-0.0677
	(0.207)	(0.107)	(0.0703)
Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0644	-0.0500	-0.193**
	(0.0605)	(0.0456)	(0.0933)
Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.200*	-0.0921	0.248**
	(0.109)	(0.0765)	(0.121)
Male Outlier Extroversion	0.0497	0.0327	0.208*
	(0.103)	(0.0640)	(0.112)
Male Outlier Openness	0.00679	0.0993	0.366***
	(0.136)	(0.0920)	(0.0981)
Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	932	1,784	1,290
R-squared	0.281	0.342	0.319
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_agree} = \beta^M_{out\_agree}$	0.929	0.866	0.286
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_consc} = \beta^M_{out\_consc}$	0.161	0.225	0.017
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_extrv} = \beta^M_{out\_extrv}$	0.236	0.448	0.040
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_open} = \beta^M_{out\_open}$	0.723	0.367	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Gendered Occupations

VARIABLES	(1) Male Occupation Hourly Wage	(2) Balanced Occupation Hourly Wage	(3) Female Occupation Hourly Wage
Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.137	-0.161*	-0.0882
	(0.114)	(0.0887)	(0.0686)
Female Outlier Conscientiousness	0.104	-0.105	0.00893
	(0.165)	(0.0986)	(0.0834)
Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0759	0.00153	-0.103*
	(0.106)	(0.0696)	(0.0546)
Female Outlier Openness	-0.247	-0.148*	0.0624
	(0.233)	(0.0852)	(0.0829)
Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0522	-0.0961*	-0.0339
	(0.0553)	(0.0508)	(0.0538)
Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.0778	-0.0218	0.0580
	(0.0980)	(0.0864)	(0.0821)
Male Outlier Extroversion	-0.0670	0.0673	0.0307
	(0.0957)	(0.0678)	(0.0864)
Male Outlier Openness	-0.0579	0.244***	0.291***
	(0.127)	(0.0823)	(0.101)
Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	930	1,950	1,375
R-squared	0.230	0.168	0.208
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_agree} = \beta^M_{out\_agree}$	0.467	0.487	0.490
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_consc} = \beta^M_{out\_consc}$	0.889	0.499	0.660
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_extrv} = \beta^M_{out\_extrv}$	0.946	0.466	0.167
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_open} = \beta^M_{out\_open}$	0.472	0.001	0.071

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Widening the definition of an outlier

VARIABLES	(1) 2 S.D. Hourly Wage	(2) 1.5 S.D. Hourly Wage	(3) 1 S.D. Hourly Wage
Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0945*	-0.0268	0.0338
	(0.0519)	(0.0413)	(0.0300)
Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.0299	-0.0645	-0.0123
	(0.0619)	(0.0405)	(0.0299)
Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0618	-0.0167	-0.0125
	(0.0418)	(0.0329)	(0.0278)
Female Outlier Openness	-0.0428	-0.113***	-0.0618**
	(0.0588)	(0.0353)	(0.0270)
Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0534*	-0.0217	0.0393
	(0.0308)	(0.0278)	(0.0242)
Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.0209	-0.00390	-0.0204
	(0.0519)	(0.0346)	(0.0267)
Male Outlier Extroversion	0.0391	0.0635**	0.0402
	(0.0463)	(0.0314)	(0.0250)
Male Outlier Openness	0.163***	0.0529	0.0392
	(0.0571)	(0.0338)	(0.0261)
Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	4,218	4,218	4,218
R-squared	0.287	0.289	0.288
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_agree} = \beta^M_{out\_agree}$	0.45	0.907	0.854
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_consc} = \beta^M_{out\_consc}$	0.51	0.204	0.802
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_extrv} = \beta^M_{out\_extrv}$	0.08	0.042	0.073
$H_0: \beta^W_{out\_open} = \beta^M_{out\_open}$	0.01	0.000	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Discussion and future research



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