# Labour Markets, Behavioural Norms and Identity

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### Question

• Do labour markets reinforce gender norms by rewarding individual traits differently according to gender?

#### Supreme Court Ruling in Sex-Bias Case Hailed by Women's Rights Groups

and difficult to work with.

COURT, From Al The case began in 1983 when Ann B. Hopkins, a management consultant, was not among the 47 employees selected for partnership at Price Waterhouse, one of the nation's "big eight" accounting firms, even though she brought in more business than any of the other 87 candidates for partnership. One supervisor suggested that she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her

er's decision before an employee there was no discrimination in the first place and that Hopkins could can be made to justify it. Justice Byron R. White also connot show that the comments she cited played any role in the specific

curred but said that Brennan was decision in her case. The reason she requiring employers to produce obwas rejected, the company argued, jective evidence, as opposed to testimony, to meet their burden of was because she was too abrasive proof


The company said that an em-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in dissent by Chief Justice ployee must prove "sex stereotyping" by male partners was the cen-William H. Rehnquist and Justice tral reason; that Hopkins must Antonin Scalia, said the decision was "certain to result in confusion" show she would have been made a partner "but for" the discrimination. rather than clarify already "complex But Brennan said that an employrules for employment discriminaee must present evidence only that tion." In these cases, Kennedy said,

ANN B. HOPKINS




... sucd Price Waterhouse

## Gender Norms and Identity




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Sector	Men	Women	Total	Male %	Female %	Dominance
Construction	809	80	889	91.00%	9.00%	Dominance
	397	96	493	80.53%	19.47%	
Transport						
Utilities	86	22	108	79.63%	20.37%	
Mining	180	53	233	77.25%	22.75%	
Manufacturing	620	212	832	74.52%	25.48%	
Agriculture	208	79	287	72.47%	27.53%	
Wholesale	251	120	371	67.65%	32.35%	
Public Admin	402	294	696	57.76%	42.24%	
Media	102	78	180	56.67%	43.33%	
Other	240	189	429	55.94%	44.06%	
Profressionals	466	384	850	54.82%	45.18%	
Arts	105	101	206	50.97%	49.03%	
Finance	182	199	381	47.77%	52.23%	
Real Estate	65	74	139	46.76%	53.24%	
Admin	149	173	322	46.27%	53.73%	
Retail	439	639	1078	40.72%	59.28%	
Accommodation	303	450	753	40.24%	59.76%	
Education	303	773	1076	28.16%	71.84%	
Health	302	1222	1524	19.82%	80.18%	

Men Women

Occupation:	Men	Women	Total	Male %	Female %
Machinery Operators and Drivers	593	51	644	92.08%	7.92%
Technicians and Trades Workers	1211	215	1426	<b>84.92</b> %	15.08%
Labourers	667	339	1006	66.30%	33.70%
Managers	968	546	1514	<b>63.94</b> %	36.06%
Professionals	1146	1461	2607	43.96%	56.04%
Sales Workers	316	630	946	33.40%	66.60%
Community and Personal Service Workers	372	889	1261	29.50%	70.50%
Clerical and Administrative Workers	392	1141	1533	25.57%	74.43%

### Finding the impact of being an outlier ( $\beta$ )

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_{outlier}I + \gamma_x X + \epsilon_i$$

### Does this effect differ for men compared to women?

$$H_0: \beta_{outlier}^W = \beta_{outlier}^M$$

The whole economy		(1)	(2)	(3)
The whole economy		Outliers	Psychological	All
	VARIABLES	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage
	Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0750	-0.162***	-0.0945*
		(0.0468)	(0.0532)	(0.0519)
	Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.101*	-0.00500	-0.0299
		(0.0543)	(0.0622)	(0.0619)
	Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0398	-0.0929**	-0.0618
		(0.0398)	(0.0440)	(0.0418)
	Female Outlier Openness	-0.134***	-0.114*	-0.0428
		(0.0227)	(0.0593)	(0.0588)
	Male Outlier Agreeableness	0.0308	-0.0432	-0.0534*
		(0.0246)	(0.0319)	(0.0308)
	Male Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.0342	-0.0159	0.0209
		(0.0453)	(0.0529)	(0.0519)
	Male Outlier Extroversion	0.184***	0.105**	0.0391
		(0.0437)	(0.0477)	(0.0463)
	Male Outlier Openness	0.0459**	0.0667	0.163***
		(0.0210)	(0.0573)	(0.0571)
	Psychological Controls	N	Y	Y
	Other Controls	N	N	Y
	Observations	7,175	4,927	4,218
	R-squared	0.010	0.099	0.287
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_agree}^W = \beta_{out\_agree}^M$	0.043	0.034	0.454
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_consc}^W = \beta_{out\_consc}^M$	0.339	0.888	0.507
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_extrv}^W = \beta_{out\_extrv}^M$	0.000	0.001	0.082
	$H_0: \beta_{out open}^W = \beta_{out open}^M$	0.000	0.022	0.009
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Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Gendered Industri	es	(1) Male Dominated	(2) Balanced	(3) Female Dominated
	VARIABLES	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage
	Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0776	-0.0630	-0.0631
		(0.143)	(0.0739)	(0.0888)
	Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.161	0.0642	-0.0751
		(0.240)	(0.111)	(0.0742)
	Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.142	-0.0329	-0.0380
		(0.137)	(0.0678)	(0.0556)
	Female Outlier Openness	0.0928	-0.0248	-0.0677
		(0.207)	(0.107)	(0.0703)
	Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0644	-0.0500	-0.193**
		(0.0605)	(0.0456)	(0.0933)
	Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.200*	-0.0921	0.248**
		(0.109)	(0.0765)	(0.121)
	Male Outlier Extroversion	0.0497	0.0327	0.208*
		(0.103)	(0.0640)	(0.112)
	Male Outlier Openness	0.00679	0.0993	0.366***
		(0.136)	(0.0920)	(0.0981)
	Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
	Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
	Observations	932	1,784	1,290
	R-squared	0.281	0.342	0.319
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_agree}^W = \beta_{out\_agree}^M$	0.929	0.866	0.286
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_consc}^W = \beta_{out\_consc}^M$	0.161	0.225	0.017
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_extrv}^W = \beta_{out\_extrv}^M$	0.236	0.448	0.040
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_open}^W = \beta_{out\_open}^M$	0.723	0.367	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Gendered Occupations		(1) Male Occupation	(2) Balanced Occupation	(3) Female Occupation
	VARIABLES	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage
	Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.137	-0.161*	-0.0882
		(0.114)	(0.0887)	(0.0686)
	Female Outlier Conscientiousness	0.104	-0.105	0.00893
		(0.165)	(0.0986)	(0.0834)
	Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0759	0.00153	-0.103*
		(0.106)	(0.0696)	(0.0546)
	Female Outlier Openness	-0.247	-0.148*	0.0624
		(0.233)	(0.0852)	(0.0829)
	Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0522	-0.0961*	-0.0339
		(0.0553)	(0.0508)	(0.0538)
	Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.0778	-0.0218	0.0580
		(0.0980)	(0.0864)	(0.0821)
	Male Outlier Extroversion	-0.0670	0.0673	0.0307
		(0.0957)	(0.0678)	(0.0864)
	Male Outlier Openness	-0.0579	0.244***	0.291***
		(0.127)	(0.0823)	(0.101)
	Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
	Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
	Observations	930	1,950	1,375
	R-squared	0.230	0.168	0.208
		•		·
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_agree}^W = \beta_{out\_agree}^M$	0.467	0.487	0.490
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_consc}^W = \beta_{out\_consc}^M$	0.889	0.499	0.660
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_extrv}^W = \beta_{out\_extrv}^M$	0.946	0.466	0.167
	$H_0: \beta_{out\_open}^W = \beta_{out\_open}^M$	0.472	0.001	0.071

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


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	(1)	(2)	(3)
	2 S.D.	1.5 S.D.	1 S.D.
VARIABLES	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage	Hourly Wage
Female Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0945*	-0.0268	0.0338
	(0.0519)	(0.0413)	(0.0300)
Female Outlier Conscientiousness	-0.0299	-0.0645	-0.0123
	(0.0619)	(0.0405)	(0.0299)
Female Outlier Extroversion	-0.0618	-0.0167	-0.0125
	(0.0418)	(0.0329)	(0.0278)
Female Outlier Openness	-0.0428	-0.113***	-0.0618**
	(0.0588)	(0.0353)	(0.0270)
Male Outlier Agreeableness	-0.0534*	-0.0217	0.0393
	(0.0308)	(0.0278)	(0.0242)
Male Outlier Conscientiousness	0.0209	-0.00390	-0.0204
	(0.0519)	(0.0346)	(0.0267)
Male Outlier Extroversion	0.0391	0.0635**	0.0402
	(0.0463)	(0.0314)	(0.0250)
Male Outlier Openness	0.163***	0.0529	0.0392
	(0.0571)	(0.0338)	(0.0261)
Psychological Controls	Y	Y	Y
Other Controls	Y	Y	Y
Observations	4,218	4,218	4,218
R-squared	0.287	0.289	0.288
$H_0: \beta_{out\_agree}^W = \beta_{out\_agree}^M$	0.45	0.907	0.854
$H_0: \beta_{out\_consc}^W = \beta_{out\_consc}^M$	0.51	0.204	0.802
$H_0: \beta_{out\_extrv}^W = \beta_{out\_extrv}^M$	0.08	0.042	0.073
$H_0: \beta_{out_open}^W = \beta_{out_open}^M$	0.01	0.000	0.001

#### Widening the definition of an outlier

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# **Discussion and future research**



	outw_a~e	outw_e~v	outw_c~c	outw_o~e
outw_agree outw_extrv	1.0000 0.0219	1.0000		
outw_consc outw_opene			1.0000 -0.0570	1.0000

